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Summary  findings
Most Central  American economies experienced slower  real exchange rate, distance from key markets, savings
growth  in the 1980s than in the  1960s and  1970s,  rates, and NAFTA. Central American economies have
trailing far behind the Asian Tigers. Contributing  to slow  low wage rates, and a considerable locational advantage
growth were severe external shocks, sizable macro-  over Asia in selling in North  American markets,
ecoriomic disturbances, and widespread political  especially Mexico. Bur real exchange rates in Central
instability.  America are more unpredictable than those in Asian
The challenges Central America faces now may be  countries.
even greater, conclude Leamer, Guerra, Kaufman, and  Central America faces a chicken-and-egg problem. To
Seguira.  because of Mexican liberalization, continuing  stabilize its terms of trade, it must expand exports of
instability of the real exchange rate, low savings rates,  manufactures. But instability in the terms of trade deters
and, finally, the North  American Free Trade Agreement.  the investments that would lead to expanded exports  of
Improvements in per capita income are closely linked  manufactures. By greatly increasing Mexico's
with exports to North  America of labor-intensive  attractiveness to foreign investors, NAFTA could be the
manufacrures. Earnings from the export of tropical  straw thar breaks the camel's back, as far as Central
agricultural products are important,  but the Central  America is concerned.
American labor force is unlikely to earn higher wages  For this reason, the governments of Central America
t.nless countries diversify more into manufacturing.  need to do all in their power to increase domestic
The Asian Tigers began their economic miracle by  savings and reduce investment risks. Exchange rate
shifting into such labor-intensive manufactures as apparel  stabilization should be carried out obviously with
and footwear, which they could export to a vast high-  appropriate macroeconomic policies - but also by
wage market.  But the U.S. market for such exports is  encouraging exports  of labor-intensive manufactures
nlow  more crowded and threatens  to become more so,  with appropriate incentives, supporting infrastructure
with exports  from China and other very low-wage  and educational investments. The key conclusion is that
countries. With Asian competition hurting Central  the future of Central America rests importantly on
America's chances, it could be said that wages in Central  exports to Mexico, a market which today is pretty miuci.
America are set in Beijing, not in San Jose.  untapped.  Investments in transportation  infrastructure
Leamner,  Guerra,  Kaufman, and Segura examine the  that can facilitate this emerging trade are likely to have
cmrical  drivers of Central America's future compe-  very large payoffs for the Central American economies.
titiveness: economic liberalization, uncertainty about the
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by the department and completed in August 1994. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under th
research project "Central America and a Liberalized  Mexico with and without NAFTA" (RPO 678-73). Copies of this paper
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This working papcr is a sclf-standing summary of a more extensive report (of the same title)
commissioncd by LA2CO and completed in August 1994.CENTRAL AMERICA
AND
THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A.  OVERVIEW
1.  Most of the Central  American economies experienced slow growth during  the
1980s in comparison with the two previous decades.  Central America has trailed way
behind the Asian Tigers including Korea,  Taiwan, and Singapore.  Among the causes
of the slow growth in Central  America were severe external shocks (gyrations in the
terms of trade, the world business cycle,  and altered access to foreign capital),  sizable
macroeconomic  disturbances and  widespread political  instability.  Naturally,  Central
America  looks forward into the twenty-first century with hopes of performance levels
greatly  improved  over  the  recent  past.  But  the  future  could  well  bring  greater
challenges for a number of reasons including the Mexican liberalization, continuing real
exchange  rate  instability,  low  savings  rates  and,  finally,  the  North  American  Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
2.  In our view improvements in per capita incomes in Central America have been
and will continue to be closely linked with exports of labor-intensive manufactures to
North American  markets.  Although earnings from  the export  of tropical  agricultural
products  are  very  important  for  the  region,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the  Central
American labor force can be employed at reasonably high wages if the region does not
diversify more into manufacturing.
3.  A shift  into  labor-intensive manufactures at early  stages  of  development  is a
prominent  characteristic  of  all  the  successful  developing  countries  in  Asia.  These
countries began their economic miracles by exporting labor-intensive manufactures such
as apparel and footwear to a high-wage market that was so vast that it seemed capable
of  absorbing  virtually  unlimited  quantities of  these products  without any  noticeable
affect on the terms of trade.  The market to which we allude was the U.S.  But the
U.S.  market  for  labor-intensive  manufactures  is  now  much  more  crowded  with
competitors than it once was, and the market threatens to become even more crowded
in the future with greatly increased imports from China and other extremely low-wage
Asian countries.  Asian low-wage countries that are crowded out of the U.S.  market
may be able to redirect their exports toward high-wage Asian markets in Japan,  Korea
and Taiwan.  These markets could well be the sources of growth for South East Asia in
the  future  as the  U.S.  was  in the past  for  Japan,  Taiwan  and  Korea.  But Central
'  Ccntral America  includes  Costa Rica,  El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua  and Panama.Cenitral America  anzd NAFTA  2
America,  for locational  and kinship  reasons,  has no  competitive advantages  in  Asia.
Nor  is Central  America  likely to  find especially favorable high-wage markets  for  its
labor-intensive manufactures in Europe.  Thus the future of Central America  seems to
rest  critically in competing effectively in North American  markets for  labor-intensive
manufactures.
4.  With that as our premise, in this document we identify the critical drivers which
will  affect  the  competitiveness  of  Central  American  exports  of  labor-intensive
manufactures to North America, and we give our assessment of their probable  impacts
in the future.
5.  One driver is economic liberalization which is sweeping the globe and adding
enormously to the size of the labor force that competes in the internationally integrated
economic system.  The Mexican liberalization which began in  1985 promises  to make
Mexico a much tougher competitor for Central American products in the U.S.  market.
The Chinese partial liberalization has already greatly  increased Chinese exports to  the
U.S.,  and promises  much more to come.  The Mexican export mix  is to some extent
differentiated  from  the  export  mix  of  the  low-wage  Asian  countries,  but  Central
America is going head-to-head against China in exporting apparel to the U.S.
6.  Offsetting the increased competition in the U.S.  market may be the emergence
and growth of new markets elsewhere.  In particular, an open and growing Mexico will
create  new  markets  for  which  Central  America  has  very  important  locational
advantages over  Asian suppliers.  For  the same locational reasons, growth  in China
and other Asian countries is not likely to generate much demand for Central  American
products.  An extremely  troubling scenario has Chinese products  flooding the  North
American  market  with  very  low-priced  goods  and  thereby  greatly  diminishing  the
possibility  of  economic  growth  in  Central  America  or  in  Mexico.  For  Central
America,  Asian  competition  has both  a  felt  and an  unfelt effect-the  first  reducing
actual exports  to  the  U.S.  and  the second  reducing future  exports  to  Mexico  which
would  have occurred  had  there  not  been the  Asian  competition.  Under  this  very
pessimistic scenario, wages in Central America are set in Beijing, not in San Jose.
7.  A second driver  is real exchange rate uncertainty.  The internationally liquid
pool of financial capital is seeking locations on the globe with workforces that can be
employed at predictably favorable wage rates.  The Central American economies have
low wage  rates but  much more  unpredictable real exchange rates than the successful
Asian  countries.  We estinate  that  the  five-year  standard  error  for  predicting  real
exchange  rates  is  about  10 percent  in  the  successful  Asian  countries  but  about  25
percent  in  most  Central  American  countries.  This  real  exchange  rate  uncertainty
closely parallels uncertainty in the terms of trade.  The five-year standard error  of the
terms of trade in Central America  is about 20 percent compared with only 9 percent in
Asia.  This  terms-of-trade  uncertainty comes from  the heavy dependence of  Central
American countries on exports  of cot'fee and bananas.  This creates  a  "chicken-and-
egg" problem.  As long as exports are not diversified into labor-intensive manufactures,CentralAmerica  and NAFTA  3
the terms-of-trade  uncertainty  will remain high which  will contribute substantially to
uncertainty  in  the real exchange rate.  But this uncertainty  in the real exchange  rate
encourages investors to choose less risky locations, and makes it more difficult for the
region to diversify into labor-intensive manufactures.
8.  A third driver  is distance.  Distance has a substantial effect on the patterns of
international trade and Central  America has a great locational advantage over  Asia  in
serving  the  North  American  market.  To  communicate  as  clearly  as  possible  we
translate  the distance  effects  into  tariff  equivalents.  The  distance  disadvantage that
China suffers compared with Mexico when selling in the U.S.  market is like a tariff of
100 percent  and more for many goods.  The locational advantage of Central  America
over Asia for selling in the Mexican market is even greater.  The distance advantage is
not  the same for  all goods,  and  Central  America  should be  moving its  product mix
toward items that are "expensive" to ship from Asia to North America.  A product to
avoid is electrical  machinery which according to our estimates travels great distances
with relatively moderate costs, conferring to Central America compared with Asia only
a  1.6:1 locational advantage in the U.S.  market and a 2.3:1  advantage in the Mexican
market.  This contrasts with apparel,  which travels with moderate costs that confer to
Central America compared with Asia a 4.1:1  locational advantage in the U.S.  markets
and a 11.2:1 advantage in the Mexican market.
9.  A  fourth  driver  is savings.  Like  many  slow-growing  poor  regions  Central
America has a low savings rate.  The relatively meager savings are dissipated over  a
rapidly growing workforce and consequently there has been little increase in the ratio
of capital to worker.  The poor but low-wage countries of Asia are experiencing capital
inflows  from  the  high-wage Asian  countries  including Japan  and  Taiwan.  Central
America  can  hope  to  attract  investments  from  the  U.S.  but  is  likely  to  be  very
dependent on internally generated savings, more so than in the past because of greater
competition from Mexico for scarce international investment funds.
10.  The fifth driver  is NAFTA.  This agreement grants Mexico preferential  access
to  the  U.S.  and  Canadian  markets,  which  creates  yet  another  threat  to  Central
American  development.  The  amount of  the preference  is  small  in  most  products,
especially in comparison with the uncertainty in the real exchange rate.  The preference
is  substantial  in  three  critical  sectors:  sugar,  apparel,  and  textiles.  Especially  in
apparel  and  textiles,  NAFTA  seems  like  a  very  troubling  agreement  for  Central
America,  but we argue here that if Mexico is " big enough" and if Central America and
other countries can access the Mexican market without facing substantial trade barriers,
then  the  lowering of  U.S.  barriers  to  Mexican products  may  actually  make  Central
America better off.  Reductions in exports to the U.S.  market can be more than offset
by  increases in exports  to Mexico,  leaving Central America exporting more at higher
prices.
11.  Countries outside of North America can benefit from NAFTA because it creates
economic forces which tend to bring down U.S.  prices to the level prevailing in the restCentral  America  and  NAFTA  4
of  the world,  thus  in  effect  eliminating  the U.S.  protection and,  more  importantly,
foreclosing  the  option  of  raising  barriers  in  the  future.  The  reason  for  this  is
straightforward,  if  not  apparent.  Provided  there  is  a  difference  in  the  price  of  a
product  sold in the protected U.S.  market and  the price  of the same product  sold in
Mexico,  Mexican producers have an incentive to ship all production to the high-price
protected  U.S.  market.  This  trade diversion  will reduce the difference  between the
protected U.S.  price and the free-trade Mexican price and thus lower the effective level
of U.S.  barriers,  possibly to zero.  The redirection of Mexican production toward the
U.S.  market in principle will make way for third country suppliers in Mexico-Central
America  being  an  obvious  choice  because  of  locational  advantages.  Thus  even  if
Central  America  does  not  have  the  same  preferential  access  to  the  U.S.  market,
provided  that  Central  American  access to  the Mexican  market  is free  of  significant
barriers,  NAFTA can imply gains for Central America as well as for Mexico.
12.  This  argument  concerning  the  effect  of  NAFTA  on  Central  America  is
summarized  schematically in  Figure  E. 1 which  shows how the losses from  NAFTA
depend on the economic size of Mexico.  If Mexico is very  small,  the agreement  is
unimportant.  A  larger  Mexico  displaces  Central  American  exports  from  North
America and causes overall revenue losses.  If Mexico is even larger, Central America
can gain, because Mexican exports flood the U.S.  market and reduce the effective U.S.
barriers.  The gains to Central America accrue when Mexico is big enough to satisfy
completely  U.S.  import demands at the protected price,  and therefore  to drive  third-
country  suppliers  out  of  the  U.S.  market.  Once  these  third  countries  are  not  the
marginal suppliers, the U.S. tariff becomes inapplicable.
13.  In the apparel sector, Mexico is now far from being large enough to undo U.S.
protection.  Mexican production levels are only about 15 percent of U.S.  imports, and
need substantial quality upgrading to compete in this new market.  By our reckoning,
Central America  stands to lose about 4 percent of its earnings from exports of apparel
as a result of NAFTA.  This number increases with Mexican growth, but the end of the
apparel protectionism  is more likely to come from successful GATT  negotiations than
from the indirect ef'fect of NAFTA.  Textiles, however, are a ditl'erent story.  Mexican
production in 1985 was already  107 percent of' U.S.  imports.  U.S.  policy intended to
protect  the  lower-end  labor-intensive  segment  ot'  textile  production  is  likely  to  be
substantially af't'ected by NAFTA, and Central America could find new opportunities  in
Mexico for these products.
14.  NAFTA  affects both  the rate of  return and  the risk of  investments  in Mexico
and  thus  the relative  desirability  of  investments  in  Central  America  compared  with
investments in Mexico.  The effect on the rate of return is adequately measurable, and
is not very large in most products compared with,  tor example, the effects ot' location
or  the  historical  variability  in  the  real  exchange  rate.  Moreover,  as  we  have just
explained,  if  Mexican  production  levels  are  great  enough,  the  reduction  of  U.S.
harriers explicitly targeted on Mexico by NAFTA,  will be spread around  the globc asCentral Anerica  and iVA  FTA  5
Mexican sales in the protected U.S.  market drive down the high U.S.  prices to  levels
prevailing in the rest of the world.
15.  Although the effect of NAFTA on the rate of return to investments in Mexico is
adequately predictable and probably fairly small, the risk-reducing effect of NAFTA is
both  quite  unpredictable  and  possibly  quite  significant.  NAFTA  promises  Mexico
future access to the very important markets in the U.S.  and Canada, and embodies an
explicit  dispute settlement  provision  for  the adjudication  of  the conflicts  which  will
surely  arise.  For that reason,  NAFTA  is rather like  the clause in  the U.S.  Federal
Constitution  which  exempts  intra-state  commerce  from  interference  from  state
governments.  Like  NAFTA,  the  Constitution,  embodies  a  dispute  settlement
mechanism, leading ultimately to the Supreme Court of the United States.
16.  The U.S.  Federal Constitution derives its significance not because it reduced or
eliminated barriers among states, but rather  because it assures producers  in  one state
access  to  markets  in  another  free  of  new  and  unexpected  interference  from  state
governments.  This  guarantee  is  obviously  important,  but  its  effects  are  extremely
difficult to assess empirically.  Likewise, NAFTA will ultimately derive it real power
from the mutual commitments of the three governments not to interfere in cross-border
commerce.  Today, we do not really know what these commitments are.
17.  The nature of the commitments in the U.S.  Federal Constitution did not become
clear until disputes were actually adjudicated.  Even today, after more than 200 years,
the meaning of the Constitution continues to evolve.  NAFTA is 2,000 pages of words
that  will  be  interpreted  by  committees  of  representatives  of  all  the  parties.  It  is
therefore  a  living  document  and  it  will  take  some  time  to  determnine exactly  what
commitment value  it really has.  Most  importantly,  it remains to  be  seen  how anti-
dumping disputes  will be resolved.  Thus NAFTA does reduce the risk of commerce
between the U.S.  and Mexico, possibly by a large amount.  Time will tell.
18.  A  second  important  risk-reducing  effect  of  NAFTA  is  that  it  makes  more
permanent the very substantial liberalization of the Mexican economy.  Liberalizations
that do  not deliver  on their  initial promises quickly enough are  necessarily reversed.
NAFTA  probably  improves the pace  at which  the favorable  effects  of  the  Mexican
liberalization will be spread among Mexican citizens and it also  increases the overall
gains.  NAFTA furthermore buys the Mexican economy more time to deliver  because
of the commitment value of an international agreement.
19.  NAFTA may also help to stabilize the Mexican real exchange rate by tying the
Mexican  economy  more  closely  with  the  U.S.  and  also  by  allowing  export
diversification  into manufacturing and  away from  petroleum.  Heavy  dependence on
petroleum exports has historically contributed substantially to instability in the terms of
trade.
20.  We do not pretend to see clearly the amount of  risk reduction afforded Mexican
investments  by  NAFTA,  nor  the  impact  of  this  risk  reduction  on  the  choice  ofCentral America and NAFTA  6
investments in Central America versus investments in Mexico.  We will show that real
exchange  rate  uncertainty  has  a  very  important  negative  effect  on  growth.  By
implication, other forms of uncertainty are also important.  Furthermore,  savings rates
in Central America  fall far short of the levels needed to  support development  strictly
from  internal  sources  and  the  attractiveness  of  Central  America  to  international
investors is essential.  For these reasons, the governments of Central America need to
do  all  in  their  power  to  reduce  the  risk  of  investments.  Actions  should  include
stabilization of  the real  exchange  rate,  free trade  agreements that promise  access  to
important foreign markets, and an internal legal system which protects the property of
investors  from  unpredictable  expropriation.  Exchange  rate  stabilization  should  be
carried  out  obviously  with  appropriate  macroeconomic  policies,  but  also  by
encouraging  exports  of  labor-intensive  manufactures  with  appropriate  incentives,
supporting infrastructure and educational investments.
21.  We now turn to more detailed analysis of these remarks.
B.  GROWTH AND TRADE
22.  There  is a  very  clear  reason  why the  external markets  for  manufactures  are
essential for improvements in per capita income.  Economic growth induced by capital
accumulation generally  is  limited by  declining marginal productivity of  capital.  An
open economy does not face as severe a problem with declining marginal productivity
of capital because the potential decline in productivity can be  offset by a  shift in the
pr-oduct Ilix  toward  more  capital-intensive  sectors  and  these products  can  be  sold
pr-ofitably in external markets.  For  the capital-scarce countries of  Central  America,
labor-intensive manufactures such as apparel and footwear are the products  of choice,
as they have been in comparable but much more successful Asian countries.
23.  Successful  growth  in  Central  America  will  therefore  almost  certainly  be
accompanied  by  greater  concentration  of  production  and  exports  on  labor-intensive
manufactures.  But without receptive markets for these manufactures, Central American
investmiients  would soon face seriously declining marginal productivity of capital.
Global Factor Supplies
24.  Thle lleckscher-Ohlin  model which  we  use to  form  a  vision  of the  future  of
Central America explains trade in terms of differences in factor supplies.  Figure  E.2
illustrates land, labor and capital supplies of a large number of countries in  1988 in a
"Leamer triangle"  which has ratio scales along the edges.  To determine the value of a
ratio, trace a line from a vertex through the point of interest in the triangle to the edge
where the scale is indicated.  This figure indicates that land per worker  in the U.S.  is
quite similar  to  Panama.  Costa  Rica.  Mexico and  Honduras have a  little  less land.
Nicarag2ua  a  bit more.  Guatemala  is much more land scarce and  El Salvador is very
scarce in land.  If the multi-cone Heck-scher-Ohlin  model is correct.  we can expect a
development path for El Salvador that is different from Costa Rica and very differentCentral America and NAFTA  7
from Nicaragua,  provided of course that changes in the labor force do not make these
countries more similar.
25.  Another feature of the 1988 data that is worth pointing out is that both Mexico
and  Costa Rica have much higher ratios of capital per  worker  than the other Central
American countries with the exception of Panama.  If the model is correct,  Mexico and
Costa  Rica are more  likely  to have production  of manufactured goods.  Indeed this
conforms well with reality, to which we now turn.
Trade Dependence Profiles for Central America
26.  In this subsection we discuss trade dependence profiles based on the commodity
aggregates  that are discussed in greater  detail in the full report (Section IV.B).  The
classification  includes two raw  materials  aggregates (Petroleum  and  Raw  Materials),
four crops (Forest Products,  Animal Products,  Tropical Agriculture and  Cereals),  and
four manufactures (Labor-intensive, Capital-Intensive, Machinery and Chemicals.)  In
terms of input intensities, these four manufactured aggregates are ordered by physical
capital  intensities, but chemicals is generally more intensive  in human capital  than is
machinery.  These four manufactured products form a  ladder of development which
many countries seem to follow, beginning with exports of apparel (LAB), then moving
on  to  textiles  and  iron  and  steel  (CAP),  and  finally  to  machinery  (MACH)  and
chemicals (CHEM).
27.  Net  exports  per  worker  of  these  ten  aggregates  in  1965  and  1988  for  El
Salvador, China, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the U.S.  are
2 reported in Table E.1  and illustrated in Figures E.3,  to E.6.  Countries in Table  E. 1
are  ordered  by  their  net  exports  per  worker  of  the  labor-intensive  manufactures
aggregate.  Care should be taken in comparing the charts because the vertical scales are
different.  The choice of scales facilitates a comparison of the comparative advantage
but  it  obscures  the  overall  level  of  trade  dependence  which  is  most  accurately
summarized by the average  absolute net export figures reported in the last column of
Table E.1.
28.  Generally  Central America  is a region with a heavy dependence on exports  of
tropical agricultural products.  A very important but more subtle feature of the table is
growing comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures.  Although only Costa
Rica  in  1988 had  positive  net  exports  of  these  labor-intensive  products,  the  other
countries in the region over this time reduced their levels of imports and seem on the
verge of becoming  net exporters.  We argue below that this trend toward  exporting
labor-intensive manufactures will continue  if and only  if Central  America experiences
reasonable levels of growth in GDP per capita.
29.  The  1988 trade patterns  and  the  1988 factor abundance  triangle  (Figure  E.2)
conform  rather  well  with  the  three-factor  Heckscher-Ohlin  model  described  in  the
2  Data assembled by Ligang Song (1993) and in Leamer (1984).Central America and NAFTA  8
previous  section.  Mexico and Costa Rica which  are about in  the same point  in the
resource triangle have about the same pattern of trade, although Mexico has substantial
receipts from petroleum exports.  Both have substantial earnings from exports of labor-
intensive manufactures.  Both export tropical agricultural products.  El Salvador,  with
its great abundance of labor but scarcity of capital is not quite able to export the labor-
intensive manufactures and  has earnings heavily  concentrated  on tropical agricultural
products.  Honduras which has about the same level of land per worker as Costa Rica
has much less capital, and therefore has no earnings from labor-intensive manufactures
and depends very  heavily on exports of tropical agricultural  products.  Nicaragua has
about  the  same capital  per  worker  as Honduras,  but  more  land,  and  is  even  more
dependent on exports of agricultural products.
30.  The  trade diagrams  also  include the two other  primary  actors  in  our  drama:
China and the U.S.  China in  1965 did  export the labor-intensive manufactures,  but
trade  per  worker  was  very  small  in  all  categories.  Chinese  trade  in  all  categories
increased enormously,  and net exports per  worker of  labor-intensive manufactures  in
particular grew  from US$0.5  per worker  to US$22.0  per  worker.  The U.S.  market
readily accepted these changes with net imports per worker growing from  US$20.7  in
1965 to US$434.9  in 1988.
31.  Panama, with an enormous appetite for machinery, is quite unusual.  Panama's
imports of labor-intensive manufactures is about the same as the U.S.  with net imports
exceeding US$400 per worker.  The U.S.  has an apparent trade deficit in merchandise
trade with cereals  and chemicals net exports not great enough to offset imports of all
otlher items.
Changing Patterns of Trade in Labor-intensive Manufactures
32.  The action in Central America is in the labor-intensive manufactures.  The same
kinid  of action is occurring in Asia.  Figures E.7a and b display the net export data of
this commodity aggregate for a large number of countries, comparing  1965 with 1988.
Figure  E.7a has the data in normal scale and Figure  E.7b uses a  logarithmic scale to
allow as many of the data to be seen as possible.'  It should be noted  that this scale
greatly compresses extreme values.  If there were no changes in comparative advantage
fromii  1965 to  1988 these data would all lie on a straight line.  Also,  a lot of the 'noise'
in the logarithmic graph occurs  for small values of net exports per  worker  which are
scaled to appear large.  Clearly, comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactures
(arppar  el  and  footwear)  is  very  much  in  turmoil  with  a  large  number  of  countries
shifting tromii  being importers to being exporters.  In response, France, the UK, Austria
and  even  Hong Kong switch  in  the opposite direction from  exporting  to  importing.
Japan  and  Belgium.  although  still  having  positive net  exports  in  this  category,  are
substantially reducing their export dependence on this product.  falling from the list of
top ten net exporters to well back in the pack.
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33.  The scatter of labor intensive net exports per worker compared with capital per
worker  in Figure  E.8  reveals the nonlinearity suggested by the multi-cone Heckscher-
Ohlin model.  At very  low levels of capital per  worker,  capital accumulation causes
increasing dependence on imports of labor-intensive manufactures.  This reverses itself
at a capital/labor ratio of around US$5,000  in 1965 dollars,  and net exports  of labor-
intensive manufactures become positively related to capital abundance.  Then, at capital
per  worker  of around  US$15,000  in  1965 dollars,  the effect  of capital  accumulation
reverses  again,  and  capital accumulation leads to  growing dependence on  imports of
these products.
34.  The  potential  nonlinearity  in  the  trade  dependence  function  is  captured
empirically with a model including higher order terms.  The models that are estimated
control for different types of land and disaggregate workers roughly into skill groups.
Heckscher-Ohlin Simulations
35.  The estimated H-O-V model can be used to predict how the labor intensive net
exports of Central America will evolve in the future.  The 1988 scatter diagram (Figure
E.8)  includes  three  different  paths generated  from  the  preferred  model.  The  solid
curve  uses world  average  levels of  the  land variables;  the  upper  curve  uses  the  El
Salvadoran land-scarce data;  the lower curve uses the Nicaraguan land-abundant data.
The curve for El Salvador is very similar to the world average, but land scarcity forces
greater  dependence  on  exports  of  labor-intensive manufactures.  The  land-abundant
Nicaraguan  case is rather different,  with capital accumulation associated always  with
increasing dependence on imports of labor-intensive manufactures.  The placement of
this  curve  is dictated  by  limitations of  the functional  form  and  the influence  of  the
countries  which  combine  both  capital  and  land  abundance  including  Australia  and
Canada.  For  our purposes,  it is more  appropriate mentally to  adjust downward  the
Nicaragua  curve  to give  it net imports of  labor-intensive manufactures earlier  in  the
development process.
36.  Curves  like those in Figure  E.8  can be used to  form projections  of the future
levels of net exports of labor-intensive manufactures.  These projections are driven by
both the capital/labor ratio and the land/labor ratio.  The land variables can change but
only  slightly over time.  Labor growth can be predicted with a  reasonable degree  of
accuracy from demographic trends.  Thus future reductions in the land/labor ratios can
be foreseen with a rather high degree of accuracy.  The capital/labor ratio is both more
important and also more difficult to project.  We will deal with our inability to project
accurately  the capital  accumulation in  Central  America  by forming  several different
scenarios,  for both the labor force and the investment rate.  The labor force has been
assumed  to  grow  pari-passu  with  population.  We consider  initially  three  different
scenarios in which the labor force grows at the average population growth  rate of the
last decade,  and in which it deviates by 10 percent above and below.  This  amount of
variability  in  the  labor  force  growth  does  not  alter  the  land/labor  ratios  or  the
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intensive  goods.  For  that  reason,  we  report  only  the case  with  future  labor  force
growth rate equal to the average growth over the last decade.  These are reported  in the
first column of Table E.2  varying from a low of 1.5 percent in El Salvador to a high of
3.5 percent in Nicaragua.
37.  The  three  scenarios  are  driven  by  three  different  assumptions  about  capital
accumulation, differing  in terms of assumed investment rates reported  in Table  E.2.4
In the first scenario, capital accumulation is driven entirely internally with investments
as a share of GNP equal to historical levels of the domestic savings rate,  varying from
a  low  of 6 percent  in  El Salvador to a  high of  25 percent  in  Mexico.  The second
scenario allows foreign investment and sets the investment ratio to  GNP equal to  the
average  investment rate  of  the last decade  which varies  much  less than  the  savings
rate-from  a low of 13 percent in El Salvador and Guatemala to a high of 26 percent in
Costa  Rica.  These  investment rates are  much higher  than the savings  rates for  the
poorer countries,  and external sources of funds are essential even to maintain  existing
capital/labor  ratios.  The third high-growth  scenario adjusts  this last  investment rate
upward  by a  factor selected to allow the relatively capital abundant countries,  Costa
Rica and Mexico, to accumulate enough capital over a decade to achieve peak levels of
net exports  per  worker of  labor-intensive manufactures.  These high  investment rates
vary from 19 to 39 percent of GNP.  This is not intended to be a plausible scenario but
rather  helps  to  determine  the  extreme  changes  in  net  exports  of  labor-intensive
manufactures and  identifies an investment rate  necessary to produce  very accelerated
development and perhaps a shift in the cone of specialization that these counties are in.
This,  in our  view,  would be  one way to escape increased competition  from China  in
labor-intensive manufactures.
38.  By inserting the estimated capital/labor  ratios and the revised land/labor  ratios
into  the  regression  equation,  we can  forecast  for  the different  scenarios  what  will
lhappen to the net exports of these economies.  The actual 1988 data do not of course
coniform with  the  regression  model  and  we do  not  want  our  projections  to  assume
implicitly that this difference is eliminated.  Denoting the estimated regression function
by:  y  =  f(x) and the actual data by y()  and Xo,  we form our prediction given the future
value  xi  as:  y,  =  y<, +  f(xl)  +  f(x,).  These projected changes are  measured  in
comparison  with an  internal GNP  yardstick  in Table E.3  and  in comparison  with  an
external marlket-size yardstick in Table E.4.
39.  Sceniarios (1)  and  (2)  do  not  predict  major  changes  in  net exports  of  labor-
intensive products compared with GNP for Costa Rica,  Panama, or Mexico,  basically
because in 1988 these countries already had relatively high levels of capital per worker.
The  effects  are  much  larger  for  Guatemala  and  Honduras,  and  especially  for  El
Salvador which under scenario (2) with historical investment rates increases net exports
per  worker  froni  US$-1.4  to  US$192, or  5.6  percent  of  1988 GNP.  In  1988 Costa
Rica  alreadv  had  net exports  of  labor-intensive manufactures  equal  to  3  percent  of
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GNP.  The highest ratio to GNP of  I1 percent occurs  for El Salvador under  the high
investment scenario (3).  These ratios to GNP seem high enough to raise concern about
NAFTA anid other external threats for  most of the countries in the region,  certainly for
Costa  Rica  and  El  Salvador,  also for  Guatemala  and  Honduras,  but  less  so for
Nicaragua and not at all for  Panama.
40.  The  external  comparisons  in  Table  E.4  reveal  that  both  the  1988 levels  of
Central American net exports and the predicted changes form a completely insignificant
share of  U.S.  imports.  These levels form a much larger share of Mexican imports,
with Central America as a whole, after satisfying the demand from Panama, comprising
19 percent of Mexican imports under the historical investment rate scenario (2) and 78
percent of Mexican imports under the high-investment scenario (3).  We argue in this
document that under NAFTA Mexico has an incentive to increase both its exports and
its imports, exporting more to the U.S.  and importing more for consumption purposes.
For that reason  the comparison with Mexican consumption in the last panel of  Table
E.4  may  be  more  appropriate  than the  comparison  with  Mexican  imports.  Under
scenario (2),  Central American  net exports comprise only 7.8  percent of the Mexican
market,  and  even  under  the  high-growth  scenario  comprise  only  33  percent,  both
figures not allowing at all for growth in Mexico over the decade.  Thus there seems to
be  ample  market  size  in  Mexico  to  accommodate  exports  of  labor-intensive
manufactures from Central America.
Growth  and Exports of Labor-intensive Manufactures
41.  We  believe  that  the  future  of  Central  America  rests  heavily  on  effective
competition  in the North  American markets  for labor-intensive manufactures.  Three
related sets of facts support this conclusion:
* The U.S.  market has become much more important for the exports of labor-
intensive manufactures from Central America;
* Countries that  are slightly ahead of  Central  America in  GDP per  capita and
capital per worker have much higher levels of net exports per  worker  of labor-
intensive manufactures; and
* High rates of economic growth in moderate-income developing countries have
almost  invariably  been  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  exports  of  labor-
intensive manufactures.
42.  The growing  importance of the U.S.  market  for Central  American  exports  is
discussed in Sections IV and VIII.A.2  of the full report.  The cross country nonlinear
patterns of trade in relation to capital abundance are discussed in Section VIL.A.3 and
serve as a data-foundation for the simulations discussed in the previous section.  Now
we turn to  the third set of facts,  the dynamic version of the nonlinear cross-sectional
model.  Here we demonstrate the linkage between growth and  labor-intensive exports
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This demonstration is not entirely straightforward because we do not expect nor do we
find  a  simple  linear  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  exports  of  labor-
intensive manufactures.  At low levels of capital abundance, we expect to see a positive
association  between  growth  in  GDP  and  growth  in  net  exports  of  labor-intensive
manufactures.  At  high  levels  of  capital  abundance,  we  expect  the  relationship  to
reverse itself.
43.  The  relationship  between  growh  and  exports  of  labor-intensive  goods  was
estimated using a data set for 62 countries and two years (1974 and  1988).  To allow
for  the  interaction  of  the  level  of  GDP  per  worker  and  growth  the  following
relationship was assumed:
A(T 1/Li) =  a  + i  x %AGDP. x [0, +  02 GDP, /Li + 03(GDPi/L  )2]
where A(T/L) is the absolute change in labor-intensive exports per worker (dollars),
%AGDP is the annualized percentage increase in GDP in dollars, and GDP/L  is GDP
per  worker  in  the initial period (1974).  This  functional form  allows  the association
between growth %AGDPi and exports A(Ti/L 1) to depend on the initial per capita GDP.
The estimated regression is:
Constant  =  -16.53;  Std. Error of Y Est.  =  408.95;
R Square =  0.2995;  No.  of Observations =  62;  Degrees of Freedom  = 58
%GDP  %GDPx(GDP/L)  %GDPx(GDP/L)2
Coefficient  0.69321  0.0712  -0.01579
Std. Err. of Coef.  0.54466  0.15496  0.00954
44.  From this estimated equation we can solve for the level of GDP per worker  at
which the association between growth and net exports turns from positive to negative.
This is US$9,000 per worker.  For countries with a GDP per worker at US$7,000  (low
GDP  per  worker  countries  for  now  on),  a  half  percentage  point  increase  in  the
annualized rate of GDP growth approximately gave (during  1974-88) a US$5 increase
in the exports of labor-intensive manufactures per worker.
45.  In Figure  E. 10 we show the very strong association between economic growth
and increaises in labor-intensive trade that has existed in Central America, with Mexico
also included.  In 1970 Central America exported US$13 per worker of labor-intensive
manufactured goods-Costa  Rica had the highest exports per worker  with US$23,  well
above the Mexican value of only US$5.  In  1990 labor-intensive exports  increased to
USS52  per worker  for Central  America.  During the two decades Costa Rica had  the
biggest absolute increase but Panama had the highest rate of growth of labor-intensive
exports.  The evolution  of  labor-intensive exports  and the rate of  growth of  GDP  is
depicted in Figure  E.9 where a clear positive relationship can be seen.  Nicaragua,  theCentral America  and NAFTA  13
only country with a negative annualized rate of GDP growth,  is also the only country
with a negative rate of growth in labor-intensive exports.
46.  The  increased  labor-intensive  manufactures went  mostly  to  the  U.S.  Central
America exported only 4 percent of the labor-intensive manufactures to North America
in 1970 but 63 percent in  1990.  We thus conclude that Central American growth has
been and very likely will continue to be closely linked with exports of labor-intensive
manufactures to North America.
C.  CHALLENGES TO CENTRAL AMERICAN GROWTH
Asian and Mexican Competition in the U.S. Market
47.  Economic growth in Central America seems very dependent on exports of labor-
intensive  manufactures  to  the  U.S.  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Canada.  But  Central
American  access  to  these  North  American  markets  is  threatened  by  increased
competition from two sources:  Asia and Mexico.  The growth in U.S.  imports from
low-wage countries over the last decade has been substantial.  Table E.5 reports the top
ten trade partners  of  the U.S.  in  1989 and  1993.  Exports  from  Mexico have  been
growing  at  the  very  healthy  pace  of  10 percent  per  year.  Exports  from  Central
America grew fifty percent faster at 15 percent per year.  But most notable of all is the
huge increase of imports from China, with a growth rate of 27 percent.
48.  The growth in U.S.  trade with Mexico and China is not an accident.  Both of
these low-wage  economies  have  been engaged  in  substantial  though  rather  different
liberalizations which have facilitated external trade.  In 1985 Mexico was a very closed
economy  with  significant  barriers  against  imports  of  most  products  and  substantial
impediments to  many kinds of exports.  The liberalization of  the Mexican  economy
since 1985 has greatly lowered Mexican barriers to international trade.4 A liberalized
and  growing  Mexico  promises  greater  competition  in  the  U.S.  market  for  Central
America but also should create attractive new markets in Mexico for Central American
products.  A liberalized China is merely  a  threat,  especially  when you  consider  the
enormous size of the Chinese workforce.
49.  The importance of the U.S.  market for Central America is all the more clear  in
the  second  part  of  Table  E.5,  where  the total  trade  figures  are  divided  by  GDP.
Measured in this way, the U.S.  market is not that important for Japan, since Japanese
exports  in 1992 to the U.S.  were only 3 percent of Japanese GDP.  This contrasts with
the Canadian figure of 18 percent, the Taiwanese figure of 12 percent and the Mexican
figure of  10 percent.  Measured  in this way,  the dependence on the U.S.  market  has
decreased for all of its top ten partners except China.
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50.  Central  America,  on the other hand, has become increasingly dependent on the
U.S.  market,  Panama  excepted.  For Costa  Rica and  Honduras,  the export  to  GDP
ratios are 25 percent.  These, of course, are Central American countries with the most
favorable recent growth experiences.
51.  In sum:  Mexico and  China seem to be on an economic collision course in the
U.S.  market.  Central America  will  be  caught in  the  collision,  but  may  escape  to
Mexico.
Short Run Elasticity Computations of the Effects of NAFTA
52.  In this Section we report preliminary estimates of the effect of NAFTA on trade
flows  in  several  key  manufactured  goods.  These estimates  are  based  on  a  partial
equilibrium  model developed in Section II which describes the effects of  preferential
tariff reductions in terms of the trade diversion of Mexican exports to the U.S.  market
and also trade creation as a result of the lowering of a barrier to trade.  We use here the
special case of that model with a perfectly elastic supply of  imports coming from  the
rest  of  the  world  (ROW).  For  commodities such  as  apparel  and  textiles,  Mexican
production  constitutes  such  a  small  share  of  total  world  exports  that  it seems  very
unlikely  that  the trade  creating aspects of  NAFTA could  have very  much  affect  on
world price levels.  Thus the infinitely elastic case seems pretty appropriate.
53.  In this case the trade diversion from the U.S.  market is the percentage change in
ROW exports given by:
dSrowISr(jow  *  -(FIllexSnmex/Sr.W)  (tniex/(  1 + tinex))  as  Erow  - J
where c  is the elasticity of Mexican export supply to the U.S.  This formula is the
product  of three  numbers:  the Mexican supply elasticity  times  the  ratio of  Mexican
exports to ROW exports times the tariff level.  The last two of these numbers are both
in the order of 0. 1 and their product is thus in the order of 0.01.  Unless the Mexican
supplv elasticity is very large, the trade diversion effect of NAFTA thus has to be verv
smnall, in  the  order  of  I  percent.  This  makes NAFTA  seem  like  a  verv  insignificant
event for  Central America  (a part  of ROW).  But, as  mentioned earlier,  under a  free
trade agreement Mexico has incentives to redirect its production to the U.S.  mar-ket  and
use cheap  imports from third parties  for consumption.  This  may make the Mexican
export supply elasticity much larger than is traditionally assumed or estimated.  In the
next  section,  we  ot'fer an  explicit  model  that  includes separately  a  Mexican  supply
function and  a  domestic  Mexican  demand  function,  not  the collapsed  export  supply
function used in this section.
54.  Table  E.6  shows the trade diversion  results ot' four dift'erent scenarios for the
Mexican export supply.  The first three cases use hypothetical elasticities ranging ftrom
an extremely  inelastic  case  (£ = (.1)  to  a  very  elastic  situation  (s =  I  0.0).  The  fourth
scenario uses the estimates of elasticities of Spanish export supplies as a proxy for the
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55.  In general,  we observe only  mild trade diversion when the Mexican supply is
very elastic, otherwise trade diversion is negligible.  This is shown by cases (1) and (2)
where  trade  diversion  does  not  exceed  1 percent  of  total  imports.  If  the  Mexican
export supplies were very elastic, then we would observe some trade diversion, but still
in the moderate range.  If the Spanish elasticities 2 were  a good approximation to  the
Mexican  ones,  then  apparel  would  exhibit  the  highest  trade  diversion  which,
nonetheless, would be almost insignificant at less than 0.5 percent of total imports.
56.  These trade diversion estimates may look promising for  Central  America,  but
they have to be taken cautiously because they do not reflect the full burden of NAFTA.
Specifically,  they  do  not  take  into  account  the  likely  case  of  Mexican  producers
exporting a much larger share of output to the U.S.  to take advantage of higher prices,
while importing cheaper products for Mexican consumption, a possibility to which we
now turn.
Estimates Allowing  for the Redirection  of Mexican  Output
57.  Tables  E.7  report  some  simulation  exercises  regarding  the  trade  diversion
effects of NAFTA allowing for the complete diversion of Mexican supply to the U.S.
market.  Four  log-linear  functions determine  the equilibrium:  U.S.  import  demand,
ROW export supply,  Mexican supply and Mexican demand.  There are  two possible
post-NAFTA equilibria.  In the first, ROW continues to export to the U.S.  market,  but
Mexican  supply is diverted  to the high-priced protected  market in  the U.S.  In the
second,  ROW exporters are driven from the U.S.  market and  the tariff  is no longer
applicable.  A bifurcated equilibrium occurs with the difference between prices in the
U.S.  and prices in ROW no longer determined by the U.S.  tariff level.  The effective
tariff  is the difference between the U.S.  price and the ROW  price,  which under  this
second condition is less than the nominal U.S.  tariff level.  A third equilibrium could
be  selected if  this effective tariff  level became negative.  Then  the U.S.  tariff  level
would be rendered totally ineffective, and the free trade equilibrium would occur with a
single  world-wide  price  level.  The  calculations  presuppose  knowledge  of  both  the
supply and demand functions which comes partly from estimated elasticities taken from
the  academic  literature,  and  partly  by  calibration  to  make  the  initial  equilibrium
conform well with the 1985 facts.  We took from Stern et al.  (1974)5 the U.S.  import
demand elasticities for each ISIC category that we analyzed.  We also employed actual
data  on  the Mexican  net-exports  to production  ratio  and  the Mexican  production  to
U.S.  imports ratio as a matching reference.  The ROW supply was assumed to be very
elastic to represent a marginal supplier that predominantly determines the international
price.  The constant in front of this ROW supply function is arbitrarily a function of the
units in which the commodity is measured.  We have set it equal to one  in all cases.
2  The data on the Spanish supply elasticities was taken from: Donges, Juergen "The Spanish Industry  in
Face of its  Integration into the European Community."  Economia Internazionale, Vol.  33,  pp.  271-81,
1980.
5  Stern,  R.M.,  J.  Francis,  and B.  Schumacher.  Price Elasticities  in International  Trade.  Macmillan,
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The Mexican supply and demand intercepts were chosen first to calibrate the numbers
to match the actual initial data, or next, to show some interesting scenarios that allow
Mexican  growth  either  from  capital  accumulation  or  from  increased  economic
efficiency as a result of liberalization.
58.  Table  E.7  shows different  scenarios for each commodity group.  The scenario
reported  in column  (1)  is  formed by calibrating  the  Mexican and  U.S.  functions to
reproduce the  1985 data on the ratio of Mexican trade to Mexican production and the
ratio of Mexican production to U.S.  imports.  In Column (2) we try to increase the size
of  Mexico to correspond with the highest growth scenario defined in Table  E.2.  The
reason  for exploring  this  rather extreme assumption is that the effect  of  NAFTA  on
Central  America depends fundamentally on the economic size of Mexico.  If Mexico is
small, Central America will lose.  If Mexico is a bit larger,  Central America will lose
even more.  But if Mexico is "large enough" Central America can actually benefit from
NAFTA.  To determine if this is a plausible outcome, we need to know how big must
Mexico be to have this ameliorative affect.
59.  The computations reported in Section 8.A.3  show that Mexican net exports  of
labor intensive goods  would be multiplied by approximately  6 times under  the high-
growth scenario after a decade of growth.  Moreover,  the capital/labor  ratio would be
multiplied  by nearly 2.5  times.  We assume that specific subcategories of  net-exports
grow  at the  same rate  as  the labor  intensive net-export  aggregate,  that capital-labor
growth translates into a roughly similar growth in production per worker,  and that U.S.
import growth is equal to population growth, then we can get some rough estimates on
the relevant ratios in Table E.7.  Specifically, with Mexican net exports increasing by a
factor of 6 and production by a factor of 2.5 the Mexican net-export to production ratio
would be multiplied by 6/2.5-roughly  2.5 times-and  the Mexican production to U.S.
imports ratio would grow by nearly 2 times.  These are the predicted figures that drive
the calibration in column (2).  If this is not enough to produce a bifurcated equilibrium,
then the size of Mexico is increased first to produce a bifurcated equilibrium,  column
(3), and next an equilibrium in which Central America is made better off, column (4).
60.  Clothing  and  Pottery  exhibit  all  four  columns,  column  (1)  with  a  relatively
small Mexico, column (2) a mid-size Mexico still without bifurcation, and columns (3)
and  (4) the cases  of  a  bifurcated equilibrium and  a  ROW benefiting  from  NAFTA,
respectively.  In the first two columns the ROW price suffers a mild deterioration,  with
a Mexican share  of U.S.  imports jumping  up strongly.  When we replicate the  1985
data in column (1) the lost earnings for ROW are rather small, 3.8 percent in Clothing
and 4.8 percent  in Pottery.  The Mexico with growth case, column (2), causes greater
losses for Central  America as a result of greater price declines  and a smaller  market
share.  If Mexican production is increased by more than a factor of 10 and the ratio of
Mexican production  to  U.S.  imports is  increased to around  90  percent,  a  bifurcated
equilibrium occurs,  with Central America losing 17 percent of its revenues in Clothing
and 8.7  percent of its revenues from Pottery.  If Mexico is a bit larger still,  with pre-
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higher prices for  its exports  which are then completely directed toward  the  Mexican
market.
61.  For Leather Products the reduction in ROW earnings in column (1) shows a 9
percent  loss, with a  strong jump  in the Mexican share of  U.S.  imports.  Column (2)
already shows a bifurcated equilibrium with Central America.  A modest increase in the
size of Mexico beyond the column (2) size is enough to make Central  America  better
off.  Glass Products  also exhibits in column  (1) a loss of earnings for  ROW on  the
order  of 9  percent,  but column (2) now displays both  a bifurcated equilibrium  and a
better off ROW with earnings increases of 21.8 percent.
62.  For Textiles and Beverages the  1985 data imply a bifurcated equilibrium  with
ROW earnings increases on the order of 6 percent.  This comes basically from  initial
Mexican production levels that are more than enough to satisfy U.S.  import demand.
Actually, the effective U.S.  tariff for Beverages is reduced to zero.
63.  All the calculations are to some extent out of date,  especially because they do
not embody economic growth and product mix changes in  Mexico as a  result of  the
Mexican  liberalization.  Leamer's  (1993)  estimates  of  the  potential  effect  of  the
Mexican  liberalization  on  the  levels  of  Mexican  output produce  output  figures  that
make  Mexico  large  enough  to  reduce  the  U.S.  effective  tariff  to  zero  in  all  these
product categories.  In this sense, NAFTA amounts to a general lowering of U.S.  trade
barriers,  not a preferential  lowering in favor  of Mexico.  And Central  America  will
gain,  provided that it is willing and able to redirect its products from the U.S.  market
to Mexico.
Destination of Central American Exports
64.  The partial equilibrium simulations that are presented here predict diversion of
Central American exports away from protected North American markets, which will be
supplied instead from North American sources which can sell free of the trade barriers
applicable  to  non-members.  This  would  radically  alter  the  geographic  pattern  of
Central American exports,  particularly for the labor-intensive manufactures which are
most likely to be subjected to trade diversion, because of their growing importance for
Central  America  and  because  these  are  the  manufactured  products  that  are  most
protected in the U.S.
65.  In the last two decades, the geographic pattern of Central American exports  of
labor-intensive  manufactures  (principally  Apparel  and  Footwear)  has  shifted
dramatically away from other Central American countries toward the U.S.  Almost 94
percent  of  Central  American  exports  of  labor-intensive manufactures  in  1970 were
shipped  to  other  Central  American  countries;  4.2  percent  went  to  the  U.S.  and
Canada;  and  only 0. 1 percent went  to Mexico.  In  1990 only  23 percent  of  Central
American labor-intensive exports stayed in the region,  and 63.3 percent  were  shipped
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66.  This enormous change in the destination of exports came not from  the collapse
of  Central  American  markets but  rather from  very  rapid growth of  exports  to  North
America.  While  exports  to other Central  American countries grew  at an  annualized
rate of 2.3  percent from  1970 to  1990, exports to the U.S.  and Canada grew at 25.8
percent.
67.  This shift  in the destination of Central  American exports of  manufactures was
experienced  especially  by Costa  Rica,  Honduras and  Panama.  Costa  Rica had  very
substantial  growth  of exports  of these products.  Costa  Rican  exports  in  1970 were
almost completely targeted on Central America, but North America and other countries
were the destination of choice in 1990.  Exports to Mexico were never substantial, even
when Costa Rican exports  were directed locally to other Central  American countries.
Honduras  and  Panama  are  very  similar,  although  Panama  exports  substantially  to
other" countries.  El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua are also similar. just a little
behind in time.  Belize, on the other hand, seems way ahead,  with exports targeted on
North America even in 1970.  But none of these countries had any exports to speak of
to  Mexico,  even  while they were  exporting  substantially to  other  Central  American
countries.
68.  The  Mexican exports  of  labor-intensive manufactures  also grew  rapidly from
1970 to  1990.  The change in the destination of these exports was more subtle, but the
increase  in  the  share  going  to  North  America  in  1990  compared  with  1980  is
substantial,  and  is compatible  with  a basic theme  of this  paper:  Mexico will target
North America, Central America should target Mexico.
Locational Advantages of Central America
69.  The  distances  between  Central  America,  Mexico  and  the  U.S.  are  short
compared with distance between these countries and the countries of Asia and Europe.
This closeness confers upon the countries of the region a mutual comparative advantage
in products  that do not travel  well over  long distances.  Although  transportation and
communication  costs  have  fallen  dramatically  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth
century,  and  trade  has  increased  much more  rapidly  than GDP,  distance  remains  a
major  deterrent to  trade and will continue to play an  important role in the economic
interactions  amontz the  countries  of  North  and  South  America  and  between  the
Americas,  Europe and Asia.
70.  Distance between partners as well as adjacency has a very substantial effect on
trade.  This is revealed by the data presented in Table E.8  which  reports the distance
between countries that is necessary to include 50 percent of trade for each of the ISIC
categories."  For example,  referring  to  the first entry  in  Table  E.8,  we  see  that  50
percent of trade in Furniture takes place between countries that are less than 645 miles
apart,  and that this distance includes only 4.9  percent of the country pairs,  falr below
Trade betwcen a pair of countries is divided by the product of thcir GNP's  in order to control  lor  the
country  sizue  ef'eci.Central Amnerica  and ANAFF4  19
the 50 percent  that  we would expect  if  distance had  no effect.  The last column  of
Table  E.8  compares  the distance effect  in  1985 with  the distance  effect  in  1970.  A
number in excess of one means that the commodity traveled longer distances in  1985
than  in  1970.  The commodities  that traveled much farther  in  1985 were,  in order:
Leather,  Apparel,  and  Other  Manufactures,  the  latter  including  jewelry,  musical
instruments,  and athletic goods.  Shoppers in the U.S.  must surely be aware how many
of  these  items come  now from  far-away  places,  namely  Asia.  But  there  are  some
products  that  do  not  travel  as  well  as  they once  did.  Listed  in  order,  these  are:
Petroleum  Refined Products,  Coal, Food,  Beverages and Transport  Equipment.  The
message here  is an  important one:  distance  is not  becoming much less imnportant  in
determining trade patterns.  It  is true that more products are coming to the U.S.  from
Asia, but the explanation for this increase in trade is larger Asian and European GDP,
not a smaller effect of distance. Thus:  Globalization has come largely from geographic
dispersal of economic activity, not from a shrinking globe.
71.  These tables make very clear that distance matters, but they do not get directly
at the task:  what kind of trade pattern should we expect among the U.S.,  an emerging
Mexico and  Central  America'?  Specifically,  how  much does  distance depress  trade?
Toward  that end we can compute the product-by-product distance advantage of Central
America compared with China for accessing the U.S.  market.
72.  Table  E.9  contains  a  commodity-by-commodity  summary  of  the  effect  of
distance on North  and Central American trade in  1985 based on a gravity model  that
explains bilateral  trade  with  a variety  of  variables  including an  adjacency effect  and
also the distance between trading partners.  The first column has the distance elasticity
and  the  second  the  adjacency  effect  defined  as  the  trade  multiplier  applicable  to
adjacent countries.  The next three columns compare the effect of distance on exports
to the U.S.  from Mexico, Central America and China.  The last two columns compare
the distance effects  for Central  America and China exporting to  the Mexican market,
first  without the adjacency effect and  second with  the adjacency effect  included,  the
latter designated as Guatemala.
73.  The Central American distance advantage over  Asia for exporting to  the U.S.
market in the first column varies from a high of  16.7 to a low of  1.6.  For the critical
labor-intensive  sectors  of  Apparel  and  Footwear  the  locational  advantage  ratios  are
around 4.  For Electrical Machinery, the advantage ratio is only  1.60.  Mexico is both
closer to the U.S.  and also adjacent.  Although the estimated adjacency effect is not
always favorable,  it generally contributes substantially to exports.  Because of both the
location and adjacency advantages,  the Mexican ratios are almost  always higher than
the  Central  American  ratios.  This  is  revealed  most  clearly  in  the  column  which
compares  Central  America  with  Mexico  as  competitors  in  the  U.S.  market.  Other
things equal, Central American apparel exports to the U.S.  would be only 70 percent of
Mexican  exports,  and  only  50  percent  of  exports  of  Electrical  Machinery.  This
Mexican advantage would  be all the greater  if the distance of  several hundred  miles
from northern Mexico to southern U.S.  were used instead of the 1,800 mile figureCentral America and NAFTA  20
74.  Competition  in  the  Mexican  market  is rather  different.  Here  the  locational
advantage of Central America over Asia is very strong, often exceeding a factor of ten
to one.  The adjacency effect of Guatemala adds a further fillip to these numbers.
75.  To  make  the  point  about  the  effect  of  distance  as  clear  as  possible,  these
distance  effects are translated into tariff equivalents reported  in Table E.10.  Starting
with the gravity model T 1j  = ca Dij I (1 +tQ) 0 we can ask:  What is the tariff-equivalent
of distance?  Take a pair of countries separated by a distance of D(.  Trade  between
them can be reduced either by  imposing a tariff or by moving them apart to the new
distance  D.  What  level of the  tariff  yields the same trade  as the distance  D?  The
formula for trade over the longer distance is T = c  D "' . The trade encumbered by the
tariff  is T = a  D(  '(1+t)  ".  These  are  equal  when  c D(  (x D(  ; (I+t)  '".  Solving  this
equation yields the tariff equivalent of distance:
Tariff equivalent of distance = (D/Do""  - I
where:  y = distance elasticity;  and 0 = tariff elasticity.
76.  The  tariff equivalents reported in Table E. 10 are  remarkably large.  The first
column  uses the elasticity estimates from Linneman et.al.  The next six columns  use
three different values for the distance elasticities and two values for the tariff elasticity.
The distance elasticity of' -1.5, -1 and -0.5 range over the set of estimated values from
Table E.8.  For each of these distance values two tariff elasticities are included: a high
tariff elasticity  of -3 and  a low tariff elasticity of -0.5.  The low value for the tariff
elasticity  yields  extraordinarily  high  values  of  the  tariff  equivalent.  This  elasticity
refers  to  an  experiment  in  which  a  tariff  is  imposed against  a  single country,  and
substitution among suppliers may make the elasticity rather high.  The number -3 seems
plausibly high and exceeds the Linneman et al estimate of -2.6.
77.  The Chinese distance disadvantage of 3.6 conmpared  with Mexico for exporting
to  the  U.S.  is equivalent  to  a  tarif'f of  approximately  23  percent  for  even  the  least
elastic distance  et'fect and  the most elastic  tariff effect.  Under  these same extreme
condition,  Central America has an advantage over Asia in the Mexican market as if the
Asian products had to tace a 37 percent tariff.  That ot' course is a substantial tariff, but
it is very small compared with most of the other tariff-equivalents in the table.
78.  Of course the effect  of distance and adjaceny are  very complex and  cannot be
completely captured in simple measures of distance.  One reason is that the effects must
be greatly  influenced by transportation infrastructure.  The estimates can also capture
cultural  influences  that  are  not  otherwise  controlled  for.  But  regardless  of  these
corrections,  it will  surely  remain  the  case  that  Central  America  has  a  substantial
locational advantage over Asia in both the U.S.  market and the Mexican market.  In the
U.S.,  however,  even without NAFTA,  the supplier of choice is Mexico.  This leads to
one  clear  conclusion:  the  future of  Central  America  rests  importantly on  exports  to
Mexico, a market which is today pretty much untapped.  Investments in transportationCentral  America  and NA PTA  21
infrastructure that can facilitate this emerging trade are likely to have very large payoffs
for the Central American economies.
Wages as a Source of Comparative Advantage
79.  Although closeness works to the advantage of both Mexico and Central America
compared  with  China  for  exporting  to  the  U.S.  market,  wage  levels  work  in  the
opposite direction.  Wages in China and other low-wage Asian countries are as low as
US$0.20 per hour compared with Mexican wages of US$1-2 and U.S.  wages of US$10
-12.  The  huge  population  levels  in  China  and  India  make  it  clear  that  for  the
foreseeable  future,  both  Mexico  and Central  America  will compete  with  China  and
other  Asian  countries  offering  low-wage low-skilled  labor to  produce  goods  for  the
U.S.  market.
80.  Low  wages  confer  comparative  advantage  in  some  products  but  not  all.
Actually,  there  are many products  that  tend to be  exported  by high-wage  countries,
presumably  because  high  wages  indicate availability  of  skilled workers.  Estimated
effects of distance are compared with the impact of the wage difference in Table E. 11.
The numbers  reported  in this  table come from the model presented  in the full report
that predicts trade as a function of importer and exporter wage rates, per  capita GNPs
and a variety of other factors.  Using Table E. 11 as a guide, the wage gap between the
U.S.  and Mexico/Central America/Asia implies that:
* Apparel is imported by the U.S.
* Beverages, Footwear and Pottery are also low-wage exports but these products
will compete in the U.S.  market with products from some high-wage countries.
* Paper Products, Transportation Equipment, Non-ferrous Metals, Machinery
and Professional Instruments should all be exported by the U.S.  to the low-wage
countries, although, except for Metal Scrap  they also are exported to high wage
countries.
* Food Products and Textiles will be traded in both directions, but with a balance
in favor of the U.S.
* Central America and Mexico might be expected to exchange Leather, Other
Food, Glass,  and Textiles.
Real Exchange Rate Uncertainty
81.  Uncertainty in the real exchange rate is a major risk factor in the allocation of
internationally  mobile  investment funds.  The  real  exchange  rate  (RER)  in  Central
America  is  more  unpredictable  than  in  Asia.  Ideally  we  would  decompose  the
uncertainty  in  the real  exchange  rates  into two  parts,  one  that  comes  from  internal
monetary management and the rest that comes from external monetary shocks and fromCentral  America  and  NAFTA  22
both internal and external real shocks.  Ideal macro economic management in principle
can eliminate  the  first,  but  there  is  nothing that  a  single country  can  do  about the
second.  Toward this goal we present regressions of the RER uncertainty on the terms-
of-trade (TOT) uncertainty.  We take the TOT uncertainty as an  imperfect measure of
the uncontrollable  fundamental and treat the residual as controllable with  ideal macro
economic management.
82.  Relatively high  TOT  variability  in Central America  compared  with Asia  does
contribute to its relatively unstable RER.  The TOT volatility in Central America comes
from  an  export  mix  that  is  heavily  concentrated  on  several  specific  agricultural
commodities,  which tend to have more volatile prices than exports of industrial goods.
Asian exports,  on the other hand, include relatively large amounts of rather diversified
mnanufactures'. In particular,  booms and busts in international coffee prices (the major
export  crop  in  Central  America)  have  been  common  in  recent  Central  American
economic history, bringing about sharp swings in the RERs'o
83.  Table E. 12 presents some measures of TOT uncertainty in Central America and
several  Asian countries during  1970-90.  These measures are  one-year and  five-year
forecast standard errors from a simple autoregressive forecasting equation analogous to
the measures of the RER uncertainty in Section III.  Excepting Indonesia, the TOT in
Asia show  smaller uncertainty  than Central America's.  This  is compatible  with  our
viewpoint that the RER in Central America  is relatively unpredictable  due,  to a  large
extent,  to  relatively  high  variability  in the TOT  shocks which  comes from  a  highly
specialized export mix, compared to Asia.
84.  These data  (excepting the outlier  Nicaragua)  plus data  for  Argentina,  Brazil,
Cyprus.  Kenya.  Peru,  Philippines.  Tanzania,  Thailand,  Tunisia  and  Turkey  and  the
cor-r-esponding  regression line are graphed in Figure E. 11 which clearly illustrates the
relationship between RER uncertainty and TOT uncertainty.  In  this figure the Asian
countries are clustered together with low RER and low TOT uncertainty,  whereas  the
Central American countries display both higher RER and higher TOT uncertainty.  The
23  observations  have  been  used  to  estimate  the  regression  (standard  error  in
parenthesis):
sRER  = 0.08  +  0.89 sTOT:  R-=  0.26
(0.06)  (0.32)
Harbergcr  (1988)  generalizes  the  argument,  pointing  out  that  the  supply  elasticity  of  tradables
(exportables and importabies) in Asia is much higlher than its counterpart in Latin America.  Therefore,
oiven  a similar exterinal shock.  the RER  in Asia has  to undergo a  smaller and quicker  adjustment  (as
compared to the one needed in Latin America)  in order to restore internal and external equilibrium.
It is important  to also considler  the imlport-induced  variability in the terms of trade.  However, when
comparing the recent economic history of Cetitral America and Asia. we notice the  fact that the hardest
implort  prices shocks felt by the two regions (i.e.,  the two oil shocks) were  common and therefore points
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where  sRER and sTOT are the five-year forecast errors in percentage form.  This
regression  allows  us  to  decompose  the  RER  uncertainty  into  that  which  is  due  to
fundamental  TOT uncertainty  and  a residual  which may  be  mostly due  to  monetary
shocks but  may also  be  partly determined  by  other real  shocks.  According  to  this
regression,  26 percent of the cross-country variability in RER uncertainty comes from
the TOT  fundamental.  The estimated coefficient  is both  statistically significant  and
economically large.  Almost 90 percent of the TOT uncertainty is translated into RER
uncertainty.
85.  Next  we  ask  how  important  is  the  RER  uncertainty  as  a  determinant  of
economic performance".  Here is a simple equation, which links growth of GDP with
RER uncertainty and terms of trade changes:
g(GDP)  = 0.08  - 0.11 sRER + 0.53 g(TOT);  R'  = 0.52
(0.007)  (0.03)  (0.20)
where  g(GDP)  is the average annual growth of real GDP  from  1970 to  1990 and
g(TOT)  is the average annual percentage change in the TOT.  The TOT effect in this
equation is both statistically significant and economically large.  This equation suggests
that  53  percent  of  the  percentage  change  in  the  TOT  is  translated  into  economic
growth.  In a static setting in which productive capacity is fixed and  improvements in
the TOT just  mean higher earnings, this would be a very large number since the trade
sector as a  share of GDP  is often much less than 50 percent.  But,  dynamically,  an
improvement  in the TOT  may allow  higher savings which  is the real  determinant  of
growth over longer periods of time.
86.  The  effect  of  RER  uncertainty  on  economic  growth  is  also  measurable
(statistically  significant)  and  economically  important.  An  increase  in  the  RER
uncertainty from the level in Korea of 8 percent to the Costa Rican level of 28 percent
is estimated to  reduce  the average  annual growth of  real GDP by 2  percent  (0.20  x
0.11  = 0.02),  or, equivalently, to reduce the total growth over this twenty year period
by 40 percent which is a very substantial number.
87.  What  improvement can Costa  Rica expect  if  all the variability  in  the RER  is
eliminated except the TOT fundamental?  Using the first regression,  sRER  =  0.08  +
0.89  sTOT,  and the Costa Rican sTOT of  0.14,  the predicted sRER is 0.08  +  0.89
x0. 14 =  0.20 compared with an actual of 0.28.  This reduction in the RER uncertainty
of 0.08  is a little less than half the gap between the Korean  value for  sRER and the
Costa Rican value.  This 0.08 figure translates into an improvement in the growth rate
of 0.080xO.110  =  0.009,  which is almost 1 percent-small  perhaps for a  single year
but equal to 20 percent over a twenty year period (neglecting issues of compounding).
This relationship was studied originally by Edwards (1988).
2  In this formulation we also used as a measure of sRER the coefficient of variation,  with very similar
results.Central America and NAFTA  24
88.  In  sum,  we  believe  that  real  exchange  rate  uncertainty  is  an  important
determinant of the future economic growth in Central America affecting the capacity of
the region to attLact  investments from either internal sources or external sources into the
production of tradable manufactures.  Even with the best macro economic management,
a  substantial  amount  of  RER  uncertainty  will  come  from  the  fundamental  TOT
uncertainty.  This creates for  Central America a chicken-and-egg problem.  Expansion
of exports of manufactures is necessary to stabilize the terms-of-trade, but the instability
in  the  terms of  trade deters  the investments that would  lead to  expanded  exports  of
manufactures.  By greatly increasing the attractiveness of Mexico to foreign  investors,
NAFTA may be  the straw that broke the camel's  back, as far  as  Central America is
concerned.25
Figure  1
Effect  of NAFTA  on Central  America
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FIGURE  E.11Table E.1
Net Exports Per Worker, Ordered by Labor-intensive Net Exports
1965 and 1988
1965  Sum
PETRO  MAT  FOR  TROP  ANL  CER  LAB  CAP  MACH  CHEM Balance  Absolute
11 China  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.0  0.8  -0.6  0.5  0.7  -0.4  -0.3  0.7  3.4
40 Mexico  1.4  9.0  -3.9  16.1  6.3  18.8  -2.0  -6.2  -71.1  -17.2  -48.9  151.9
18 El Salvador  -8.1  -3.5  -10.0  113.3  -2.3  37.3  -12.6  -28.0  -70.8  -32.4  -17.0  318.1
13 Costa Rica  -21.6  -7.2  -23.9  202.0  12.5  -21.6  -15.8  -90.0  -137.5  -65.0  -168.1  597.1
24 Honduras  -11.6  11.9  2.4  135.0  7.3  12.7  -17.2  -50.2  -57.6  -24.4  8.2  330.6
58 USA  -24.0  -11.3  -14.9  -31.4  -10.8  63.7  -20.7  -8.1  114.9  23.2  80.7  322.9
43 Nicaragua  -16.0  9.6  -3.7  61.9  9.9  143.0  -22.9  -62.6  -105.3  -60.4  -46.5  495.2
45 Panama  -57.4  -3.7  -42.3  79.0  7.5  -27.1  -65.9  -100.4  -141.2  -58.9  -410.3  583.4
1988  Sum
PETRO  MAT  FOR  TROP  ANL  CER  LAB  CAP  MACH  CHEM Balance  Absolute
13 Costa Rica  -13.3  -5.1  -61.4  628.9  158.4  -68.9  132.0  -88.2  -206.0  -157.4  318.9  1519.5
11 China  4.6  1.8  -1.5  2.4  3.7  -0.2  22.0  -0.4  -15.1  -5.1  12.3  56.8
40 Mexico  170.1  26.2  -15.9  54.3  -4.1  -44.7  20.3  -26.6  -48.7  -39.1  91.7  450.0
18 El Salvador  -5.9  -5.5  -16.5  238.4  13.8  -66.6  -1.4  -15.7  -137.2  -56.6  -53.2  557.7
24 Honduras  -7.4  3.5  -8.5  327.8  82.8  -28.0  -3.0  -39.0  -134.0  -78.0  116.2  712.1
43 Nicaragua  -1.1  -0.1  -4.8  75.1  -22.7  28.9  -6.9  -43.0  -41.2  -31.3  -47.1  254.9
58 USA  -308.6  -29.4  -35.6  -87.3  -25.6  219.6  -434.9  -177.7  -487.8  84.6  -1282.7  1891.1
45 Panama  -96.2  4.5  -58.6  372.4  159.3  -114.5  -587.6  -172.9  -3643.5  -189.9  -4327.0  5399.6Table E.2
Capital  Accumulation  Scenarios
Average  '81  - '90  Investment/GNP  Capital  per  Worker  (Thousands)
Lab. Force jSavings/  Investment/  1988  Projections
Country  Growth  IGNP  IGNP  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)
COSTA  RICA  2.9%  0.24  0.26  0.24  0.26  0.39  6.16  6.48  7.45  17.12
EL  SALVADOR  1.5%  0.06  0.13  0.06  0.13  0.19  1.76  1.24  4.46  12.77
GUATEMALA  2.9%  0.09  0.13  0.09  0.13  0.19  2.32  1.37  2.07  4.22
HONDURAS  3.3%  0.11  0.15  0.11  0.15  0.23  1.88  1.89  3.37  9.07
NICARAGUA  3.5%  0.05  0.22  0.05  0.22  0.32  2.32  0.71  4.78  13.65
PANAMA  2.4%  0.19  0.17  0.19  0.17  0.26  6.11  6.88  5.75  11.76
MEXICO  2.2%  0.25  0.21  0.25  0.21  0.32  7.35  11.07  8.25  17.93
Scenarios:  (1) Savings  Rate  Only
(2) Historical  Investment  Rate
(3) High Investment  RateTable E.3
Projected  Changes  in Labor-Intensive  Trade, Internal  Comparison
1988  Net Exports of Labor-Intensive Products per Worker Net Exports of Labor-Intensive Products/GNP
GNP  1988  'Scenarios  1988  Scenarios
Country  per Capita  Actual  (1)  (2)  (3)  Actual  (1)  (2)  (3)
COSTA RICA  1616  132.0  150.9  173.1  244.2  3.05%  3.49%  4.00%  5.65%
EL SALVADOR  1059  -1.4  69.4  191.8  373.3  -0.04%  2.04%  5.64%  10.99%
GUATEMALA  881  -7.1  37.7  65.9  138.9  -0.26%  1.39%  2.43%  5.13%
HONDURAS  859  -3.0  21.1  70.3  200.3  -0.11%  0.75%  2.51%  7.14%
NICARAGUA  813  -6.9  -107.1  4.3  90.5  -0.26%  -4.05%  0.16%  3.42%
PANAMA  1927  -587.6  -557.6  -581.6  -498.0  -10.89%  -10.34%  -10.78%  -9.23%
MEXICO  2023  20.3  88.4  47.9  95.4  0.35%  1.53%  0.83%  1.65%
Scenarios:  (1) Savings  Rate Only
(2) Historical Investment Rate
(3) High Investment Rate
Note: Net exports of labor-intensive goods per worker are in 1988 dollars.Table  E.4
Projected  Changes  in Labor-intensive  Trade, External  Comparison
Net Exports of Labor Intensive Products  ___  __IMPORTS  __  MXICAN  _CONSUMPTIO
1988-  Millions of  dollars  % US IMPORTS  %MEXICAN IMPORTS  %MEXICAN CONSUMPTION
Scenarios  Scenarios  Scenarios  Scenarios
Country  Actual  (1)  (2)  (3)  Actual  (1)  (2)  (3)  Actual  (1)  (2)  (3)  Actual  (1)  (2)  (3)
COSTA RICA  131.7  200.7  230.2  324.8  0.16%  0.24%  0.28%  0.39%  65%  10.0%  11.4%  16.1%  2.8%  42%  4.8%  6.8%
EL SALVADOR  -2.2  127.3  352.0  685.2  -0.00%  0.15%  0.43%  0.83%  -0.1%  6.3%  17.5%  34.0%  -0.0%  2.7%  7.4%  14.3%
GUATEMALA  -20.7  145.3  253.6  535.1  -0.02%  0.18%  0.31%  0.65%  -1.0%  7.2%  12.6%  26.5%  -0.4%  3.0%  5.3%  11.2%
HONDURAS  -4.4  43.4  144.6  412.1  -0.01%  0.05%  0.17%  0.50%  -0 2%  2.2%  7 2%  20.4%  -0.1%  0.9%  3.0%  8.6%
NICARAGUA  -7.7  -168.6  6.7  142.6  -0.01%  -0.20%  0.01%  0.17%  -0 4%  -8.4%  0.3%  7.1%  -0.2%  -3.5%  0.1%  3.0%
PANAMA  -485.9  -587.1  -612.3  -524.3  -0.59%  -0.71%  -0.74%  -0.63%  -24 1%  -29.1%  -30.4%  -26.0%  -10.2%  -12.3%  -12 8%  -11.0%
TOTALCA  -389.3  -239.0  3749  1575.5  -0.47%  -0.29%  0.45%  1.90%  -19.3%  -11.9%  18.6%  78.2%  -8.1%  -50%  7.8%  33.0%
MEXICO  595.6  3231.1  1750.7  3485.3  0.72%  3.90%  2.11%  4.21%
Scenarios:  (1) Savings Rate  Only
(2) Historical  Investment  Rate
(3) High  Investment  Rate48
Table E.5
TOP  TEN U.S.  TRADE  PARTNERS  AND  CENTRAL  AMERICA
(Thousands  of U.S. Dollars)
Top Ten Suppilers  of U.S Imports
Share  Growth
1989  1993  1993  Rate
CANADA  89,323,483  113,148,331  18.94%  6.09%
JAPAN  95,107,558  109,153,793  18.27%  3.50%
MEXICO  26,947,371  39,432,557  6.60%  9.99%
CHINA  12.762,004  33,577.174  5.62%  27.36%
GERMANY  25,608,344  28,923,770  4.84%  3.09%
TAIWAN  25,498,565  26,170,053  4.38%  0.65%
UNITED  KINGDOM  18.550,272  21,944,892  3.67%  4.29%
KOREA,SOUTH  20,410,085  17,639.935  2.95%  -3.58%
FRANCE  13.124,824  15,380,882  2.57%  4.05%
ITALY  12.556,742  13,649,148  2.28%  2.11%
Total Top 10 Suppliers  339,889,248  419,020.535  70.14%  5.37%
Central  America  2848547  4887398  0.82%  14.45%
COSTA  RICA  1,063,789  1,673.079  0.28%  11.99%
GUATEMALA  667,544  1.281.706  0.21%  17.71%
HONDURAS  531,657  984,769  0.16%  16.66%
EL SALVADOR  257.348  505.884  0.08%  18.41%
PANAMA  283,287  254,865  0.04%  -2.61%
NICARAGUA  34  134,434  0.02%  692.97%
BELIZE  44.888  52.661  0.01%  4.07%
Top Ten Purcharsers  of U.S. Exports
CANADA  64,977,464  91.865.900  20.91%  9.04%
JAPAN  42,764.273  46,045,048  10.48%  1.87%
MEXICO  24.117.255  40,265.478  9.17%  13.67%
UNITED  KINGDOM  19,642.736  24,497.314  5.58%  5.68%
GERMANY  16,069.190  17,946.800  4.09%  2.80%
TAIWAN  10.974.696  15.585.360  3.55%  9.16%
KOREA. SOUTH  13,207.742  14.358.535  3.27%  2.11%
FRANCE  10,919.097  12,462,697  2.84%  3.36%
NETHERLANDS  10,876.043  12.167.525  2.77%  2.84%
SINGAPORE  7.001.752  10.655,052  2.43%  11.07%
Total Top 10 Exposures  220.550.248  285.849.709  65.07%  6.70%
Central  America  3.301.991  5.834.531  1.33%  15.29%
COSTA  RICA  863,730  1.504.155  0.34%  14.88%
GUATEMALA  647,033  1,267.554  0.29%  18.31%
PANAMA  679,829  1.086.757  0.25%  12.44%
HONDURAS  504.992  867.033  0.20%  14.47%
EL SALVADOR  513.904  847.143  0.19%  13.31%
NICARAGUA  1.802  141.486  0.03%  197.67%
BELIZE  90.701  120.403  0.03%  7.34%
Total Trade
CANADA  154.300.947  205.014.231  19.78%  7 36%
JAPAN  137.871.831  155.198.841  14.97%  3.00%
MEXICO  51.064.626  79.698.035  7.69%  11 77%
GERMANY  41.677.534  46.870.570  4.52%  2.98%
UNITED  KINGDOM  38.193.008  46.442.206  4.48%  5 01%
CHINA  18.537.482  42.196.484  4 07%  22 83%
TAIWAN  36.473.261  41.755.413  4.03%  3 44%
KOREA.SOUTH  33.617.827  31.998.470  3.09%  -1 23%
FRANCE  24.043.921  27.843.579  2.69%  3.74%
ITALY  20,198.271  19.782.192  1.91%  -0.52%
Source:  National Trade Data Bank.4i-)
Table E.5
Continued
TOP  TEN  U.S.  TRADE  PARTNERS  AND  CENTRAL  AMERICA
(Trade  /GDP)
Top Ten Suppliers  of U.S Imports
Growth
1989  1992  Rate
CANADA  0.16  0.18  2.9%
JAPAN  0.03  0.03  -6.7%
MEXICO  0.13  0.10  -8.3%
CHINA  0.03  0.06  27.5%
GERMANY  0.02  0.02  -10.0%
TAIWAN  0.17  0.12  -10.5%
UNITED KINGDOM  0.02  0.02  -4.7%
KOREA,SOUTH  0.10  0.06  -15.5%
FRANCE  0.01  0.01  -5.5%
ITALY  0.01  0.01  -10.6%
Central  America
COSTA  RICA  0.20  0.24  5.6%
GUATEMALA  0.08  0.11  12.3%
HONDURAS  0.10  0.25  35.1%
EL SALVADOR  0.04  0.06  17.2%
PANAMA  0.06  0.04  -14.2%
NICARAGUA  0.00  0.04  953.4%
BELIZE  0.13  0.13  -0.5%
Top Ten Purcharsers  of U.S. Exports
CANADA  0.12  0.15  7.2%
JAPAN  0.01  0.01  -5.6%
MEXICO  0.12  0 12  -0.4%
UNITED  KINGDOM  0.02  0.02  -4.6%
GERMANY  0.01  0.01  -6.4%
TAIWAN  0.07  0.07  -2.0%
KOREA,  SOUTH  0.06  0.05  -8.2%
FRANCE  0.01  0.01  -2.6%
NETHERLANDS  0.05  0.04  -5.6%
SINGAPORE  0.24  0.19  -6.8%
Central America
COSTA  RICA  0.17  0.21  7.6%
GUATEMALA  0.08  0.11  13.1%
PANAMA  0.15  0.17  3.9%
HONDURAS  0.10  0.24  34.2%
EL SALVADOR  0.08  0.11  12.8%
NICARAGUA  0.00  0.10  275.1%
BELIZE  0.27  0.24  -4.1%
Total Trade
CANADA  0.28  0.32  4.7%
JAPAN  0.05  0 04  -6.4%
MEXICO  0.25  0.22  -4.4%
GERMANY  0 04  0.03  -8.6%
UNITED  KINGDOM  0.05  0.04  -4.7%
CHINA  0.04  0.08  21.9%
TAIWAN  0.25  0.19  -7.8%
KOREA,SOUTH  0.16  0.11  -12.5%
FRANCE  0.02  0.02  -4.2%
ITALY  0.02  0 02  -9 7%
Source: National Trade Data Bank and IMF International  Financial  StatisticsTable E.6
Trade Diversion Scenarios
Total  US  Mexican  Mexican  Output/ Mexican  Exports/  Trade  Diversion  as Percentage
Imports/  Import  U.S.  Imports  Mexican  Output  of  Total  Imports
ISIC Product  Tariff  US  Output  Share  Current  Current  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
313 Beverages  0.05  0.097  0.027  1.238  0.022  -0.01%  -0.13%  -1.27%  -0.01%
321 Textiles  0.12  0.074  0.019  1.065  0.018  -0.02%  -0.21%  -2.07%  -0.12%
322 Wearing A  0.24  0.332  0.018  0.142  0.125  -0.03%  -0.34%  -3.42%  -0.47%
323 Leather,P  0.17  0.422  0.014  0.448  0.030  -0.02%  -0.20%  -1.99%  -0.00%
361 Pottery,C  0.12  0.646  0.023  0.382  0.061  -0.03%  -0.25%  -2.50%  -0.02%
362 Glas,Prod  0.13  0.098  0.080  0.599  0.134  -0.09%  -0.93%  -9.25%  -0.31%
Scenarios  (1) Inelastic Mexican Export Supply (0.1)
(2) Unit Elastic Mexican Export Supply (1)
(3) Elastic Mexican Export Supply (10)
(4) Spanish Export Supply Elasticity. Source: Donges (1980)Table E.7.a
NAFTA Effects Under Different Supply Conditions
Clothing  Glass Prod.
Actual  (1)  Predicted  (2)  (3)  (4)  Actual  (1)  Predicted  (2)
Data  Data  Data  Data
U.S. Import Demand
Constant  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5
Elasticity  -3.92  -3.92  -3.92  -3.92  -1.6  -1.6
Mexican Supply
Constant  0.25  0.5  2  3  1.65  3.75
Elasticity  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5
Mexican Demand
Constant  0.3  0.45  1.25  1.25  2.675  4
Elasticity  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9
R.O.W. Supply
Constant  1  1  1  1  1  1
Elasticity  5  5  5  5  5  5
Tariff Level  24.0%  24.0%  24.0%  24.0%  13.0%  13.0%
Pre-NAFTA
Mexican Share of U.S. Imports  1.8%  1.9%  8.8%  9.7%  42.5%  62.7%  8.0%  8.3%  40.2%  38.8%
ROWShare of U.S. Imports  98.2%  98.1%  91.2%  903%  57.5%  37.3%  92.0%  91.7%  59.8%  61.2%
ROW Export Share to Mexico  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Mexican Net Exports / Production  12.5%  12.0%  31.2%  32.5%  47.1%  60.3%  13.4%  13.7%  33.5%  34.2%
Mexican Production / U.S. Imports  14.2%  15.6%  28.3%  29.7%  90.2%  104.0%  59.9%  60.4%  119.9%  113.5%
Post-NAFTA
Bifurcated Equilibrium  0  0  1  1  0  1
U.S. Price Change  -0.6%  -1.2%  -4.0%  -6.5%  -1.6%  -9.5%
ROW Price Change  -0.6%  -1.2%  -3.1%  1.7%  -1.6%  3.4%
Effective Tariff  24.0%  24.0%  23.1%  15.8%  13.0%  0.1%
U.S. Import Change  2.6%  4.9%  17.2%  29.9%  2.6%  17.3%
Mexican Share of U.S. Imports  20.8%  38.3%  100.0%  100.0%  69.0%  100.0%
Mexican Production Change  36.8%  35.6%  29.9%  24.9%  17.3%  3.4%
ROW Share of U.S. Imports  79.2%  61.7%  0.0%  0.0%  31.0%  0.0%
ROW Export Change (Trade Creation)  -3.2%  -6.0%  -14.6%  9.0%  -7.7%  18.4%
ROW Earnings  Change  -3.8%  -7.2%  -17.7%  10.7%  -9.3%  21.8%
ROW Exports to U.S. Change  -15.6%  -19.8%  -100.0%  -100.0%  -61.9%  -100.0%Table E.7.b
NAFTA  Effects Under  Different  Supply  Conditions
Pottery  Textiles
Actual  (1)  Predicted  (2)  (3)  (4)  Actual  (1)
Data  Data  Data
U.S. Import  Demand
Constant  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5
Elasticity  -2.85  -2.85  -2.85  -2.85  -1.14
Mexican  Supply
Constant  0.825  1.75  2.25  2.75  3.125
Elasticity  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5
Mexican  Demand
Constant  1.2875  2.4  2.75  2.75  6.375
Elasticity  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9
R.O.W. Supply
Constant  I  1  1  1  1
Elasticity  5  5  5  5  5
Tariff Level  12.0%  12.0%  12.0%  12.0%  12.0%
Pre-NAFTA
Mexican  Share  of U.S. Imports  2.3%  2.4%  11.7%  11.6%  20.4%  33.5%  1.9%  1.8%
ROW Share  of U.S. Imports  97.7%  97.6%  88.3%  88.4%  79.6%  66.5%  98.1%  98.2%
ROW Export  Share  to Mexico  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Mexican  Net Exports  / Production  6.1%  6.3%  15.3%  15.1%  21.9%  32.5%  1.8%  1.7%
Mexican  Production  / U.S. Imports  38.2%  38.3%  76.4%  76.9%  93.3%  103.2%  106.5%  105.8%
Post-NAFTA
Bifurcated  Equilibrium  0  0  1  1  1
U.S.  Price Change  -0.8%  -1.6%  -2.3%  4.5%  -8.2%
ROW  Price Change  -0.8%  -1.6%  -1.5%  0.8%  1.0%
Effective  Tariff  12.0%  12.0%  11.2%  6.7%  2.8%
U.S.  Import  Change  2.4%  4.6%  6.8%  14.1%  10.3%
Mexican  Share  of U.S. Imports  43.8%  85.1%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
Mexican  Production  Change  17.1%  15.8%  14.5%  10.6%  4.2%
ROW  Share  of U.S. Imports  56.2%  14.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
ROW  Export Change  (Trade  Creation)  -4.0%  -7.5%  -7.2%  4.0%  5.0%
ROW  Earnings  Change  -4.8%  -9.1%  -8.7%  4.8%  6.0%
ROW  Exports  to U.S.  Change  -39.6%  -79.7%  -100.0% -100.0%  -100.0%Table  E.7.c
NAFTA  Effects  Under  Different  Supply  Conditions
Leather,  P.  Beverages
Actual  (1)  Predicted  (2)  (4)  Actual  (1)
.__________________________  Data  Data  Data
U.S.  Import  Demand
Constant  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5
Elasticity  -1.58  -1.58  -1.58  -1.64
Mexican  Supply
Constant  1.15  2.375  3  2.9675
Elasticity  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5
Mexican  Demand
Constant  2.1125  4.0875  4.0875  5.775
Elasticity  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9  -0.9
R.O.W.  Supply
Constant  1  1  1  1
Elasticity  5  5  5  5
Tariff  Level  17.0%  17.0%  17.0%  5.0%
Pre-NAFTA
Mexican  Share  of U.S.  Imports  1.4%  1.4%  6.8%  6.6%  22.4%  2.7%  2.5%
ROW  Share  of U.S.  Imports  98.6%  98.6%  93.2%  93.4%  77.6%  97.3%  97.5%
ROW  Export  Share  to Mexico  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Mexican  Net  Exports  / Production  3.0%  3.1%  7.6%  7.4%  21.5%  2.2%  2.4%
Mexican  Production  / U.S.  Imports  44.8%  44.6%  89.7%  89.9%  104.1%  123.8%  105.7%
Post-NAFTA
Bifurcated  Equilibrium  0  1  1  1
U.S.  Price  Change  -1.6%  -4.1%  -8.6%  -4.0%
ROW  Price  Change  -1.6%  -1.9%  0.9%  1.0%
Effective  Tariff  17.0%  14.8%  7.6%  0.0%
U.S.  Import  Change  2.5%  6.8%  15.2%  7.0%
Mexican  Share  of U.S.  Imports  53.8%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%
Mexican  Production  Change  23.6%  18.9%  10.7%  1.2%
ROW  Share  of U.S.  Imports  46.2%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
ROW  Export  Change  (Trade  Creation)  -7.5%  -9.3%  4.4%  5.0%
ROW  Eamings  Change  -9.1%  -11.2%  5.3%  5.9%
ROW  Exports to U.S.  Change  -51.3%  -100.0% -100.0%  -100.0%54
Table E.8
Distance  Within Which 50% of GNP-Adjusted  Trade Takes Place
1970  1985
distance  country  distance  country  1985:
'SIC  (miles)  per cent  (miles)  per cent  1970
332 FURNITURE  645  4.9  645  4.5  1.0
353 PETR. REF.  1132  10.5  727  5.1  0.6
356 PLASTIC NEC  705  5.4  743  5.2  1.1
314 TOBACCO  776  7.0  743  5.2  1.0
380 METAL SCRAP  822  7.4  745  5.3  0.9
354 MISC. PETR. & COAL  1070  9.6  748  5.7  0.7
342 PRINTING  785  7.0  776  6.4  1.0
369 OTHER NON-METAL  910  8.2  794  6.6  0.9
381 METAL PRODUCTS  1012  9.2  794  6.5  0.8
362 GLASS  1070  9.6  1030  8.5  1.0
351 CHEMICALS  1354  13.8  1098  9.2  0.8
361 POTTERY  794  7.1  1168  10.2  1.5
385 PROF., SCI., MEAS. EQ  1191  11.5  1191  10.5  1.0
352 OTHER CHEMICALS  1452  14.5  1210  10.7  0.8
355 RUBBER  1168  11.1  1221  11.1  1.0
371 IRON & STEEL  1214  11.9  1265  11.7  1.0
313 BEVERAGES  1762  18.7  1266  11.8  0.7
321 TEXTILES  1421  14.2  1341  12.6  0.9
324 FOOTWEAR  840  7.6  1354  12.6  1.6
382 MACHINERY  1363  13.9  1363  12.8  1.0
384 TRANSPORT EQUIP.  1926  20.1  1363  12.8  0.7
331 WOOD  1485  15.3  1421  13.0  1.0
341 PAPER  1554  16.0  1472  13.8  0.9
383 ELECT. MACH.  1452  14.5  1551  14.5  1.1
322 APPAREL  705  5.4  1571  14.8  2.2
372 NON-FERROUS  METAL  1579  16.5  2229  20.2  1.4
323 LEATHER  1098  10.0  2596  22.3  2.4
312 OTHER FOOD  3826  27.5  3539  24.5  0.9
390 OTHER MANUF.  1846  19.3  3918  27.0  2.1
311 FOOD  5647  43.5  3933  27.3  0.7
Note: These distances correspond to the distance between  the
pair of countries at which the cumulative ratio of GNP-adjusted
exports is equal to 50% of the total.  The country ratio
corresponds to the percentage of pairs of countries among  which
these exports take place.I'AI3I.E E.9
AD)VANTAGE  CONI'LRRKII) 1P)  I)ISI AN'I:  ON AMERI(CAN I'RADI):
IJS  MARKIl.I  Pl.EAClI  Ml'XI('AN  MARKEI  [ lACl'
I)ist.  Adj.  C.A./  Mex./  C'.A./  C.A./  C.A./  (iuat./
ISIC  Elast.  Lffect  Asia  Asia  Mcx.  N.Mcx.  Asia  Asia
353  PETROLEUM REFINE'RIES  -2.60  (.5  16.7  14.6  1.1  0.0  126.9  66.9
341  MANUF. OF PAPER AND PAPER PROI)UCrS  -1.59  1.0  5.6  7.3  0.8  0.1  19.5  18.7
380  METAI  SCRAP FROM MANUF. CI  :A13RICATFID)  MIlAl.  PRODI)S.  -1.59  11.3  5.6  85.9  0.1  0.0  19.2  217.7
314 l'OBACCO MANUFACTUJRlS  -1.52  2.6  5.2  18.1  0.3  0.0  16.9  44.0
372  NON-FERROUS METAI  BASIC INDUSTRIES  -1.49  0.9  5.0  5.7  0.9  0.1  16.0  13.7
354  MISC. PRODUCTS OF PET'ROLEUM  AND COAL  -1.49  3.8  5.0  25.3  0.2  0.0  16.0  60.5
371  IRON AND STEEL BASIC INDUSTRIl.S  -1.46  1.0  4.9  6.2  0.8  0.1  15.3  14.7
369  OTHERNON-METALLIC  MINERAI. PRODUC1'S  -1.45  1.3  4.8  8.1  0.6  (.1  15.0  18.9
313 BEVERAGE INDUST'RIES  -1.35  0.9  4.3  4.9  0.9  0.1  12.3  10.7
322 MANUFACTUREOFWEARINGAPPARELEXCEPTI:OOTWEAR  -1.29  1.0  4.1  5.4  0.7  0.1  11.2  11.6
324 MANUF. FOOTWEAR EXCEPTlRUBBER OR PLASTIC  -1.27  2.3  4.0  11.9  0.3  0.0  10.7  25.1
321  MANUFACTURE OF  IEXTILES  -1.21  0.8  3.7  3.6  1.0  0.2  9.6  7.3
331  MANUF. WOOD, WOOD AND CORK PROD)S.. EXCEl''lFURNIIlJRE  I  -1.18  2.4  3.6  10.7  0.3  0.1  9.0  21.3
312 OTHER FOOD MANUFACTURING  -1.10  1.4  3.3  5.9  0.6  0.1  7.7  11.2
352  MANUFACTUREOFOTI.LRCHEMICAI.IPRODUCTIS  -1.06  0.8  3.1  3.1  1.0  0.2  7.2  5.8
384  TRANSPORT EQUIPMEN'r  -1.03  1.4  3.0  5.1  0.6  0.1  6.8  9.4
332  MANUF, FURNITUREI.  FIXT'URES  EXCEPT.PRIMARII.Y MI.1lAL.  -0.98  3.7  2.9  12.9  0.2  0.1  6.2  22.9
355 RUBBER PRODUJCT'S  -0.96  2.1  2.8  7.1  0.4  0.1  6.0  12.4
362 GLASS AND GLASS PRODUCTS  -0.96  2.1  2.8  7.1  0.4  0.1  6.0  12.5
311 FOOD MANUFACT'URING  -0.96  1.6  2.8  5.3  0.5  0.1  6.0  9.3
351  MANUFACTUREOFINDUSTRIALCIIEMICALS  -0.91  1.3  2.7  4.1  0.6  0.2  5.5  7.1
323  MANUF. PRODS LEATHER EXCEII'  FOO'I'WEAR AND Al'l'ARI.I.  -0.90  1.4  2.6  4.3  0.6  0.2  5.3  7.3
361  POTTERY, CHINA AND EART'liWARE  -0.84  3.4  2.5  9.8  0.3  0.1  4.8  16.1
381  FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, EXCEI'T MACII. AND EQUIP.  -0.82  2.1  2.4  6.0  0.4  0.1  4.6  9.7
382  MANUFACTURE OF MACIIINERY EXCE'PT  ELECI'RICAI.  -0.77  1.0  2.3  2.7  0.9  0.3  4.2  4.2
342  PRINTING, PUBLISHING AND ALLIED  INDUS'I'RIES  -0.76  2.5  2.3  6.7  0.3  0.1  4.1  10.4
356  PLASTIC PRODUCTS N.E.C.  -0.66  3.0  2.1)  7.0  0.3  0.1  3.4  10.3
385  SCIENTIFIC, MEASURING AND CONT'ROl. EQUIP.  -0.47  1  .6  1.7  2.9  0.6  0.3  2.4  3.9
390  OTHER MANUFACTURING INDUS'I RIES  -0.46  2.0  1.6  3.5  0.5  0.2  2.4  4.6
383  ELEC. MACHINERY, APPARATUS, APPLIANCES & SUPPLIES  -0.45  1.9  1.6  3.4  0.5  0.2  2.3  4.4
Distance  Matrix
US  CA  MEX  CIIINA  N.MEX
US  2238  1843  6616  400
CA  2238  1199  8741
MEX  1843  1199  7734
CIIINA  6616  8741  7734Table E.10
Tariff Equivalent of Distance
Elasticities
Tariff  -2.2  -3  -0.5  -3  -0.5  -3  -0.5
Distance  -1.6  -1.5  -1.5  -1  -1  -0.5  -0.5
1  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%
1.5  34%  22%  238%  14%  125%  7%  50%
2  66%  41%  700%  26%  300%  12%  100%
2.5  95%  58%  1463%  36%  525%  16%  150%
3  122%  73%  2600%  44%  800%  20%  200%
Distance  3.5  149%  87%  4188%  52%  1125%  23%  250%
Multiple  4  174%  100%  6300%  59%  1500%  26%  300%
4.5  199%  112%  9013%  65%  1925%  28%  350%
5  222%  124% 12400%  71%  2400%  31%  400%
5.5  245%  135% 16538%  77%  2925%  33%  450%
6  268%  145% 21500%  82%  3500%  35%  500%
6.5  290%  155% 27363%  87%  4125%  37%  550%
Notes: The first column uses the elasticity estimates of Linneman et.al.
Distance Matrix: Miles
US  CA  MEX  CHINA
US  2238  1843  6616
CA  2238  1199  8741
MEX  1843  1199  7734
CHINA  6616  8741  7734
Distance Ratios
Supplier
CA  MEX  CHINA
Market  US  1  1.21  1.0o  3.61
MEX  I  1.0  |  6.5157
Table E.11
Comparative  Avantage  of Mexico  Compared  With China in U.S. Market
Mexican  Closeness  Offset by Chinese  Wages
Wage*  Distance Combine Mexico/  Mexico*/
ISIC  Effect  Effect  China  China
311 Food  0.3  4.3  1.4  5.2  1.4
390 Other  manufac.  1.4  2.0  2.8  0.0  2.0
312 Otherfood  0.6  5.3  3.0  7.5  2.4
322 Wearing  App.  0.4  7.1  3.1  0.0  1.3
321 Textiles  0.5  6.3  3.4  0.0  1.0
324 Footwear  0.7  6.9  4.7  0.0  3.6
361 Pottery,  china  1.6  3.6  5.7  0.2  5.7
331 Wood  1.0  6.0  6.3  0.1  7.3
314 Tobacco  0.8  10.0  7.6  11.6  8.5
323 Leather  2.3  3.9  8.8  0.3  4.3
332 Furniture  2.3  4.4  10.1  0.1  13.7
356 Plastics  4.9  2.7  13.4  0.2  15.2
381 Fabricated  met  5.9  3.4  20.2  0.1  16.7
355 Rubber  4.8  4.3  20.6  0.1  15.8
369 Other  non-met  2.4  9.0  21.4  0.4  9.1
352 Other  chem.  6.1  4.9  29.9  0.5  9.3
385 Prof. & Scien.  15.5  2.0  31.5  0.5  20.7
362 Glass  7.8  4.3  33.2  1.6  21.3
342 Printing  11.1  3.2  35.2  1.0  33.8
383 Elec. mach.  19.8  2.0  39.3  1.8  29.1
351 Ind. Chemicals  10.0  4.0  39.9  4.2  18.7
380 Metal scrap  6.9  11.0  '6.2  304.1  479.6
384 Transport  equip  19.9  4.7  94.4  4.3  40.6
372 Nonferrous  met  11.2  9.5  106.7  16.9  37.3
382 Machinery  42.6  3.2  136.3  1.7  53.5
341 Paper  27.6  11.2  307.8  21.0  139.8
313 Beverage  41.2  7.7  316.9  39.5  119.9
371 Iron  & steel  40.3  9.2  370.1  8.5  110.3
354 Misc.  petro  60.2  9.5  570.7  512.3  749.7
353 Petroleum  13.4  51.1  682.8  26.5  100.8
NOTES: Wage  effect include  per capita GDP  change  (holding  fixed GDP)
Mexico*  removes  the Latin  American  Effect58,
TABLE  E.12:  CENTRAL  AMERICA  AND  ASIA
TERMS  OF  TRADE  UNCERTAINTY
EQUATION: LNTOT = a + b*LNTOT(-1)
PERIOD  1970-1990
COEFFIC.  SE  OF  1-YEAR  5-YEAR
COUNTRY  LNTOT(-1)  REGRES FCAST  ER FCAST  ER RA2  BAR
EL SALVADOR  0.50 *  0.18  0.20  0.23  0.17
NICARAGUA  0.79 *  0.12  0.13  0.20  0.61
GUATEMALA  0.71 *  0.13  0.14  0.20  0.45
HONDURAS  0.66 *  0.11  0.12  0.16  0.39
COSTA  RICA  0.52 *  0.11  0.12  0.14  0.27
PANAMA  0.24  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.00
MEXICO  0.76 *  0.13  0.14  0.21  0.55
INDONESIA  0.79 *  0.19  0.21  0.34  0.74
MALAYSIA  0.57 *  0.10  0.11  0.13  0.29
HONG  KONG  0.84 *  0.07  0.07  0.12  0.68
KOREA  0.75 *  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.77
TAIWAN  0.84 *  0.05  0.05  0.09  0.79
CHINA  0.66 *  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.40
SINGAPORE  0.76 *  0.05  0.05  0.08  0.76
* Significant  at 5% level
SOURCE:  IMF,  INTERNATIONAL  FINANCIAL  STATISTICS
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